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What risks and challenges do credit default swaps 
pose to the stability of ﬁ  nancial markets?
Credit default swaps (CDSs) pose a number of risks to institutions and markets, many of which are not 
unique. These risks include counterparty credit, operational, concentration, and jump-to-default risks. 
CDSs also pose other risks and challenges. For example, CDS markets generally lacked transparency, 
which may have compounded market uncertainty about participants’ overall risk exposures, the concentration 
of exposures, and the market value of contracts during the recent crisis. Further, regulators note that the 
potential existed for market participants to manipulate certain CDS prices to proﬁ  t in other markets that 
CDS prices might inﬂ  uence, such as the equity market, and that the lack of transparency could contribute to 
this risk. Others also raised concerns about the use of CDSs for speculative purposes, including concerns 
about uncovered or “naked” CDS positions – the use of CDSs for speculative purposes when a party 
to a CDS contract does not own the underlying reference entity or obligation. While regulators and market 
participants note that over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, to varying degrees, pose some similar risks, 
particularly equity derivatives, the US regulatory structure for CDSs does not provide any one regulator 
with authority over all participants in the CDS market, thereby making monitoring and managing potential 
systemic risk difﬁ  cult. 
ORICE WILLIAMS BROWN 
Director
Financial Markets and Community Investment
US Government Accountability Ofﬁ  ce
NB: This article was based on testimony before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises, “Systemic risk: regulatory 
oversight and recent initiatives to address risk posed by credit default swaps” (GAO-09-397T). Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include Karen 
Tremba, Assistant Director; Kevin Averyt, Nadine Garrick, Akiko Ohnuma, Paul Thompson, and Robert Pollard. 
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C
redit default swaps (CDSs) offered the 
most recent example of the challenges 
of regulating ﬁ   nancial markets in the 
21st century. Like many other over-the-counter 
(OTC) derivatives, CDSs pose a variety of risks and 
challenges to ﬁ  nancial institutions and the stability 
of the ﬁ  nancial system. In the months leading up to 
the most recent crisis, CDSs became a major focus 
when CDS spreads widened in the days leading 
up to the bankruptcy of Bear Stearns as more 
CDS buyers sought credit protection, concerns were 
raised around the settlement of CDS contracts on 
Lehman Brothers following its bankruptcy, and the 
likelihood of a bankruptcy increased at American 
International Group, Inc. (AIG) as a result of losses 
generated by the company’s sale of CDSs. The 
unfolding crisis led many to question the opacity of 
the CDS markets and how best to manage their risks. 
While the recent crisis has prompted reconsideration 
of the current regulatory structure to better enable it 
to address systemic issues that may arise, it has also 
prompted regulators to push for and  several major 
banks to commit to clear OTC derivative trades, 
including CDSs, through a clearinghouse. 
1| CDS POSE FOUR MAIN RISKS 
  TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
  AND MARKETS  
The main risks to ﬁ  nancial institutions and markets 
from credit default swaps include counterparty 
credit risk, operational risk, concentration risk, and 
jump-to-default risk. However, the degree of risk 
associated with CDS varied depending on (1) the 
type of CDS, (2) the reference entity for the 
CDS, and (3) how the CDS was used. In simple 
terms, counterparty credit risk is the risk to each 
party in an OTC derivatives contract that the 
other party will not fulﬁ  ll the obligations of the 
contract. Banks and other ﬁ  nancial institutions 
that have large derivatives exposures use a variety 
of techniques to limit, forecast, and manage their 
counterparty risk, including margin and collateral 
posting requirements. In particular to CDS, besides 
potentially not receiving contractual payments, 
a purchaser of CDS whose counterparty fails would 
suddenly be left without protection and could either 
have to replace the CDS contract at current, higher 
market values or go without protection. 
Regulators, market participants, and observers 
identiﬁ   ed several challenges in managing 
CDS counterparty credit risk. First, although margin 
and collateral posting serve as a primary means 
of mitigating the risk of loss if a counterparty 
does not perform on its contractual obligations, 
calculating margin and collateral amounts can be 
difﬁ  cult because of the challenges associated with 
determining the actual amount of counterparty 
exposure and the value of the reference asset. 
Speciﬁ  cally, agreeing on the valuation of CDS contracts 
on asset-backed securities (ABS) and collateralised 
debt obligations (CDOs) may be difﬁ  cult  for 
market participants. Second, margining practices 
are not standardised and vary depending on the 
counterparty. For example, market participants and 
observers suggested that institutions with high credit 
ratings, for which exposures were considered to pose 
little credit risk, were not initially required to post 
collateral. These ﬁ  rms included bond insurers and 
AIG Financial Products, a noninsurance subsidiary 
of AIG. However, when some of these institutions’ 
ratings were downgraded, the institutions had 
difﬁ   culty meeting collateral calls. Third, the 
CDS market lacks comprehensive requirements 
for managing counterparty credit risk. Finally, 
bilateral collateral and margin requirements for 
OTC derivatives do not take into account the 
counterparty credit risk that each trade imposes 
on the rest of the system, allowing systemically 
important exposures to build up without sufﬁ  cient 
capital to mitigate associated risks.
The second type of risk is operational risk. This is 
the risk that losses could occur from human errors 
or failures of systems or controls. With CDSs, there 
are several operational steps that are required 
to process trades, such as trade conﬁ  rmation, 
which were not automated until recently and thus 
created backlogs in the system. In a report issued 
in 2007, Government Accountability Ofﬁ  ce (GAO) 
reported that these backlogs were largely due 
to a decentralised paper-based system and the 
assignment of trades to new parties without 
notifying the original dealer – a process known as 
novation. For instance, in September 2005, some 
63 percent of trade conﬁ   rmations (or 97,650) 
of the 14 largest credit derivatives dealers had 
FSR14_BROWN.indd   138 FSR14_BROWN.indd   138 13/07/2010   09:14:32 13/07/2010   09:14:32ARTICLES
Orice Williams Brown: “What risks and challenges do credit default swaps pose to the stability of ﬁ  nancial markets?”
Banque de France ￿ Financial Stability Review ￿ No. 14 – Derivatives – Financial innovation and stability ￿ July 2010  139
been outstanding for more than 30 days. These 
large backlogs of unconﬁ  rmed trades increased 
dealers’ operational risk, because having unconﬁ  rmed 
trades could allow errors to go undetected that might 
subsequently lead to losses and other problems. 
Potential problems also existed in the operational 
infrastructure surrounding physical settlement, 
novation, and valuation of CDS.
The third type of risk, concentration risk, refers to 
the potential for loss when a ﬁ  nancial institution 
establishes a large net exposure in similar types of 
CDS. For example, AIG presented concentration 
risk because it sold a signiﬁ   cant amount of 
CDS protection on related reference entities 
without also holding offsetting positions and did 
not sufﬁ  ciently manage this risk. This risk tends 
to be greater for dealers that sell CDS protection 
because no margin and collateral requirements 
exist to help ensure that the selling ﬁ  rm will be able 
to meet its potential obligations. Also, the potential 
exposures are greater and more uncertain than the 
ﬁ  xed premium payments of a purchaser of CDS 
protection. Additionally, if a market participant 
decides to hold a large concentrated position, 
it could experience signiﬁ  cant losses if a credit 
event occurred for one or more reference entities. 
But concentration risk can create problems for 
market participants even without a credit event 
involving the reference entity. For example, 
a market participant may face obligations to 
post collateral on a large net exposure of CDSs 
if its ﬁ   nancial condition changes, potentially 
resulting in ﬁ  nancial distress for the dealer. AIG is 
a well-known example of this problem. When 
its credit rating was downgraded, the contracts 
required that it post collateral, contributing to the 
company’s liquidity crisis.
Market participants suggested that the degree of 
risk from concentrated net exposures was tied to 
the nature of the reference entity or obligation. 
For example, a concentrated position in CDSs on 
mortgage-related CDOs may present more risk than 
CDSs on a highly-rated corporation or US government 
bonds. Further, concentration risks at one ﬁ  rm may 
also present challenges to other market participants 
and the ﬁ  nancial system. According to a regulator 
and an observer, the lack of clear information on 
the net CDS exposures of market participants makes 
informed decisions about risk management difﬁ  cult, 
a situation that becomes increasingly problematic 
when a credit event occurs. A regulator also testiﬁ  ed 
that because the CDS market was interconnected, 
the default of one major participant increased the 
market and operational risks faced by more distant 
ﬁ  nancial market participants and impacted their 
ﬁ  nancial health. The near-collapse of AIG illustrates 
the risk from large exposures to CDSs.
Finally, jump-to-default risk, as it relates to the 
CDS market, is the risk that the sudden onset of 
a credit event for the reference entity can create 
an abrupt change in a ﬁ   rm’s CDS exposure. 
Such a credit event can result in large swings in 
the value of the CDS and the need to post large and 
increasing amounts of collateral and ultimately 
fund the settlement payment on the contact. The 
default of a reference entity could put capital 
strain on the CDS seller from increased collateral 
and payment obligations to settle the contract. 
For example, because CDSs generally are not 
funded at initiation, a CDS seller may not 
have provided sufﬁ  cient collateral to cover the 
settlement obligations. 
2| CDSS CAN ALSO POSE 
  A NUMBER OF OTHER RISKS 
  AND CHALLENGES, INCLUDING 
  LACK OF TRANSPARENCY, 
  POTENTIAL FOR MANIPULATION, 
  AND SPECULATION 
Other risks and challenges from CDS include a lack 
of transparency in the CDS market, the potential 
for manipulation related to the use of CDS as 
a price discovery mechanism, and the use of CDS for 
speculative purposes. According to some regulators, 
market participants, and observers, limited 
transparency or disclosure of CDS market activity 
may have resulted in the overestimation of risk in 
the market. Such a lack of transparency may have 
compounded market uncertainty about participants’ 
overall risk exposures, the concentration of 
exposures, and the market value of contracts. For 
example, some have noted that uncertainty around 
how bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers would affect 
market participants contributed to a deterioration 
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of market conﬁ  dence. More speciﬁ  cally, according 
to some reports, up to USD 400 billion of CDSs 
could have been affected, but the Depository 
Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC) 
later stated that its trade registry contained 
USD 72 billion of CDS on Lehman Brothers, 
and this amount was reduced to about 
USD 21 billion in payments after bilateral 
netting. The actual number was reported 
to be even lower. Some market participants suggested 
that concerns about transparency were even more 
prevalent with customised CDS products because the 
contracts were not standardised and their prices were 
determined using estimates rather than prices from 
actual transactions. 
Some suggested the potential existed for market 
participants to manipulate prices to proﬁ  t  in 
other markets that CDS prices might inﬂ  uence, 
such as the equity market, and that the lack of 
transparency could contribute to this risk. CDS price 
information is used by some market participants 
as an indicator of the market’s perception about 
a company’s ﬁ  nancial health. Market participants 
use spreads on CDS contracts to gauge the ﬁ  nancial 
health and creditworthiness of a ﬁ  rm. However, 
two regulators and an industry observer suggested 
that whether CDS prices accurately reﬂ  ected 
creditworthiness was unclear because the market 
was largely unregulated and the quality of data 
is questionable in an opaque market. According 
to testimony by a Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) ofﬁ  cial in late 2008, the lack of 
transparency in the CDS market also created the 
potential for fraud, in part because the reporting and 
disclosure of trade information to SEC was limited. 
More speciﬁ  cally, the ofﬁ  cial testiﬁ  ed that a few 
CDS trades in a relatively low-volume or thin market 
could increase the price of the CDS, suggesting that 
an entity’s debt was viewed by the market as weak. 
Because market participants may use CDS as one of 
the factors in valuing equities, this type of pricing 
could adversely impact a reference entity’s share 
price. One market observer we spoke with offered 
the following hypothetical example: if the CDS 
price moves up and the equity price moves down, 
an investor could proﬁ  t from holding a short position 
in the equity by buying protection in the CDS market. 
The SEC ofﬁ  cial testiﬁ  ed that a mandatory system 
of record keeping and reporting of all CDS trades 
to SEC should be used to guard against the threat 
of misinformation and fraud by making it easier 
to investigate these types of allegations. However, 
another regulator suggested that the price discovery 
role was not a unique role to CDS and that 
exchange-traded derivatives such as foreign 
exchange and interest rate derivatives also served 
a price discovery function.
Another challenge identiﬁ   ed by regulators and 
market participants was the frequent use of CDS 
for speculative purposes, an issue that has raised 
some concerns among some regulators and industry 
observers. Some have suggested that the practice 
should be banned or in some way restricted. However, 
other regulators and market participants disagree 
and note that speculators in the CDS market provide 
liquidity to the market and facilitate hedging. Many 
of the concerns stem from uncovered or “naked” 
CDS positions or the use of CDS for speculative 
purposes when a party to a CDS contract does not 
own the underlying reference entity or obligation. 
Because uncovered CDS can be used to proﬁ  t from 
price changes, some observers view their function 
as speculation rather than risk transfer or risk 
reduction. For example, one regulatory ofﬁ  cial stated 
that these transactions might create risks, because 
speculative users of CDS have different incentives 
than other market participants. In addition, one 
regulator stated that when participants used CDS for 
speculative purposes, there was no direct transfer 
or swap of risk. Instead, the transaction creates risk 
from which the participant aims to proﬁ  t. Market 
participants also noted that the risks associated with 
CDS did not stem from their use for speculation but 
from a failure to manage the risks, particularly CDS 
of ABS (asset backed securities). Market participants 
and an observer also explained that a restriction 
on uncovered CDS would create a market bias in 
favor of protection buyers, because it is easier for 
them to hold a covered position. This bias could 
impact the liquidity of the market, because trading 
would be conﬁ  ned to those with an exposure to 
the referenced entity. Finally, market participants 
noted that ﬁ  rms used CDS to manage risks from 
many economic exposures in addition to risks such 
as counterparty credit exposures that arise from 
holding the underlying reference obligation.
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3| CDSS OVERSIGHT HIGHLIGHTS 
  THE CHALLENGES OF AN OUTDATED 
  REGULATORY SYSTEM
The current regulatory structure for CDSs and other 
OTC derivatives does not provide any one regulator 
with the authority over all market participants, 
making potential systemic risk hard to monitor 
and manage. In the United States, federal oversight 
of CDS trading is largely conducted through the 
banking regulators’ safety and soundness oversight 
of the supervised banks that act as dealers in the 
market. Unlike equities or futures markets that 
are regulated by SEC and the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC) respectively, CDSs 
are not regulated broadly as ﬁ  nancial products 
because SEC and CFTC lack authority to do so. 
Federal ﬁ  nancial regulators, namely the banking 
regulators, generally monitor activity in the 
CDS market through information obtained from 
their supervised entities, but comprehensive and 
consistent data on the overall market have not been 
readily available.
Regulators have sought to address potential 
systemic threats arising from CDS activities mainly 
through collaborative efforts with other US and 
foreign supervisors and key market participants. 
However, the extent to which regulators routinely 
monitored the CDS activity of unregulated market 
participants is unclear. While US federal ﬁ  nancial 
regulators do not have authority over CDS as 
a product, in the United Kingdom, the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) has authority over most 
CDS products and can collect information on those 
products. Despite this broader authority, FSA has 
pursued most of its regulatory efforts in collaboration 
with US regulators. 
Financial regulators and the industry have 
initiated several efforts to begin addressing some 
of the most important risks posed by CDS and 
similar products, particularly operational and 
counterparty credit risks. These efforts include 
improving the operational infrastructure of 
CDS markets, implementing a clearinghouse or 
central counterparty to clear CDS trades, and 
establishing a central trade registry for CDSs. 
If implemented effectively and sustained, the 
recent initiatives could begin to address some 
of the risks related to the use of CDS. However, 
their effectiveness will likely be constrained by 
two factors. First, participation in a clearinghouse 
and central trade registry is generally voluntary. 
And second, the efforts would not include the 
more customised and highly structured CDSs that 
can include CDSs on complex reference entities 
that may pose signiﬁ  cant risks to institutions and 
ﬁ  nancial markets. A number of other reforms to 
the CDS market have surfaced but face challenges. 
These include mandatory clearing or restricting 
CDS trades. Finally, OTC derivatives that share 
some of the risks related to CDSs could beneﬁ  t from 
similar efforts to mitigate their impact.
Financial regulators and market participants 
have recently taken steps to try to address risks 
posed by CDSs. The efforts have focused on 
three main areas: (1) operational and infrastructure 
improvements, (2) creation of a central trade 
repository, and (3) development of clearinghouses 
to clear CDS contracts. In September 2009, 15 major 
banks committed to clear most of their OTC trades 
through a clearinghouse. 
The issues involving CDSs have illustrated the current 
system of regulation lacks broad authority to monitor, 
oversee, and reduce risks to the ﬁ  nancial system 
that are posed by entities and products that are not 
fully regulated, such as unregulated subsidiaries 
of regulated institutions, and other non-bank 
ﬁ  nancial institutions. The absence of such authority 
may be a limitation in identifying, monitoring, and 
managing potential risks related to concentrated 
CDS exposures taken by any market participant. The 
inability of the regulators to monitor activities across 
the market and take appropriate action to mitigate 
them has contributed to the current crisis and the 
regulators’ inability to effectively address its fallout. 
Going forward, any regulator tasked with a systemwide 
focus would need broad authority to gather and disclose 
appropriate information, collaborate with other 
regulators on rule making, and take corrective action 
as necessary in the interest of overall ﬁ  nancial market 
stability, regardless of the type of ﬁ  nancial product or 
market participant.
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